Partiality by Keller Simon

Author:Keller, Simon.
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2013-03-07T16:00:00+00:00

1 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection.”

2 For an instance of this deontological approach to partiality, see Nathanson, Patriotism, Morality, and Peace, p. 70.

3 “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 18.

4 “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 18.

5 Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” p. 462.

6 For versions of this view, see Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality”; Parfit, Reasons and Persons, especially pp. 24 and 43–45; Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, chs. 1–2, 9; and Baron, “Patriotism and ‘Liberal’ Morality,” pp. 70–71.

7 See “How Emotions Reveal Value and Help Cure the Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” p. 173; and “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” pp. 453–455.

8 See the discussions in Swanton, “Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection: A Pluralistic Value-Centered Approach,” pp. 168–170; McKerlie, “Aristotle and Egoism,” pp. 531–537; and Annas, “Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism.”

9 For more on the problem of self-effacement, including a broader survey of the literature, see my “Virtue Ethics Is Self-Effacing.”

10 I am grateful to Toby Handfield for improving my formulation of this idea.

11 See, for example, Ronnow-Rasmussen, “Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers.”

12 On welfarism and its relationship with utilitarianism, see my “Welfarism”; and Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, ch. 7.

13 For surveys of the various theories of welfare, see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 493–502; Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics; and my “Welfare as Success.”

14 See, for example, Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, chs. 9–10; and Foot, Natural Goodness, chs. 3, 5.

15 See Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction.”

16 See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, especially pp. 39–42. For a relevant contemporary statement, see Velleman “Love as a Moral Emotion,” especially pp. 344–348.

17 “Love as a Moral Emotion.”

18 See my The Limits of Loyalty, ch. 6; and Brighouse and Swift, “Legitimate Parental Partiality.”

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